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#Challenges in risk assessment
Insidious erosion of safety margins over time
NSOAF - Second international safety conference in the 
upstream oil & gas industry, 
Aberdeen, 22nd -23rd November 2010
Dr. Frank Hedlund
COWI, Denmark
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NSOAF 2010. Insidious erosion of safety over time
#Theme: Challenges (and pitfalls) 
in Risk Assessment
 HSE Research report RR151.
 Additional challenge: that of 
incrementalism
leading to drift
 The sum of many small steps, all 
in the wrong direction.  While 
each step is insignificant when 
viewed in isolation, combined 
they accumulate to reduce 
safety over time in an stealthy 
manner oblivious to all involved 
actors, operators and oversight 
agencies alike
2
NSOAF 2010. Insidious erosion of safety over time
#Alaska Airlines flight 261
Loss of Control and Impact with Pacific
Ocean Alaska Airlines Flight 261
McDonnell Douglas MD-83, N963AS
About 2.7 Miles North of
Anacapa Island, California
January 31, 2000
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NSOAF 2010. Insidious erosion of safety over time
#Purpose
 To examine this crash, with a focus not on the technical failure of 
the mechanical components, but on the roles played by the human 
influence from upper management of Alaska Airlines and the FAA 
down to the culture of the maintenance crew
 In summary, the root cause of Flight 261’s tragic end was not the 
failure of the jackscrew assembly, but rather the cumulative and 
insidious effect of both economic and organizational 
pressures acting on all levels of Alaska Airline’s organizational 
hierarchy. 
 The true value of the lessons learned from Flight 261 lies in the 
importance of taking a comprehensive, systems perspective of 
organizational risks.
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#Type of aircraft in flight. 
5
NSOAF 2010. Insidious erosion of safety over time
#Tail wing – control surfaces
6
NSOAF 2010. Insidious erosion of safety over time
#Jackscrew assembly within the 
horizontal and vertical stabilizers
7
NSOAF 2010. Insidious erosion of safety over time
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NSOAF 2010. Insidious erosion of safety over time
#Acme nut
Gimbal nut from Alaska Airlines flight 261, shown below as attached to front spar of stablizer from the 
aircraft's tail, and in close-up
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NSOAF 2010. Insidious erosion of safety over time
#Acme nut severely worn 
Approximately 90 percent of the 
thread thickness had worn away 
before the remainder of the 
threads sheared off. 
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NSOAF 2010. Insidious erosion of safety over time
#Jackscrew with metal shavings
Jackscrew from horizontal stabilizer of Alaska Airlines flight 261, recovered from the wreckage
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NSOAF 2010. Insidious erosion of safety over time
#Cause of excessive wear: 
Lubrication failure
 Preventive measure:
 Alaska Airlines, with FAA approval, increased the lubrication 
interval from 500 flight hours to every eight calendar months. 
(wear is a function of aircraft usage, not calendar time). 
(decreases the tolerance for missed or inadequate lubrication). 
 Risk control measure:
 The thread wear check to determine the airworthiness of the 
jackscrew assembly was required at every other C check. However, 
the C check interval was extended. 
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NSOAF 2010. Insidious erosion of safety over time
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NSOAF 2010. Insidious erosion of safety over time
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NSOAF 2010. Insidious erosion of safety over time
#The extentions
 The extensions were hardly the product of manufacturer 
recommendations alone, if at all. 
 A much more complex and constantly evolving web of committees 
with representatives from regulators, manufacturers, 
subcontractors, and operators was at play. 
 All extensions have (presumably) undergone a successful risk 
assessment (pitfall)
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NSOAF 2010. Insidious erosion of safety over time
#Characteristics of drift
 Each extension made local sense, and was only an increment away 
from the previously established norm.
 No rules were violated, no laws broken.
 The regulator concurred with the changes.  These were normal 
people doing normal work
 Maintenance technicians were never required to record or keep 
track of thread-wear measurements.  The manufacturer had not 
expressed interest in seeing these numbers or the slow unfavorable 
trend they might have revealed.
 If there was a drift, no institutional or organizational memory 
would know it.
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NSOAF 2010. Insidious erosion of safety over time
The last thread wear measurement
#Accident airplane's last 
thread wear check - 1997
18
"Horizontal Stab - acme screw and nut has maximum allowable end play limit
(.040 in.)." The planned action box, which was filled out by the day-shift
lead mechanic and inspector, stated, "Replace nut and perform E.O. 8-55-10-
01."
NSOAF 2010. Insidious erosion of safety over time
#Log entries by mechanic
 September 29th (Monday) - the graveyard-shift lead mechanic 
made several entries in the graveyard-shift turnover plan, including 
 "continue parts ordering (PANIC),"
 "need copy of E.O. 8-55-10-01 for horiz stab acme screw and nut 
excessive end play," and 
 "… [scheduled] departure looks doubtful."
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NSOAF 2010. Insidious erosion of safety over time
#Measuring nut thread wear -
using a "restraining fixture" 
20
To allow operators to monitor acme nut wear without removing the jackscrew assembly from the airplane, Douglas 
developed the on-wing end play check procedure. The procedure calls for pulling down on the horizontal stabilizer 
by applying a specified amount of torque to a tool known as a restraining fixture to change the load on the acme 
screw from tension to compression
NSOAF 2010. Insidious erosion of safety over time
#Fixture manufactured in-house
 Up until the time of the 
accident, Alaska Airlines 
had only one restraining 
fixture in its inventory. The 
fixture was manufactured 
in-house… 
 During several of these 
tests, the in-house 
restraining fixtures yielded 
lower end play 
measurements …
21
NSOAF 2010. Insidious erosion of safety over time
Two Alaska Airlines-fabricated restraining fixtures and three Boeing 
manufactured fixtures
#Grease type changes
 In 1996, Alaska Airlines asked McDonnell Douglas if a new grease 
could be used in place of the original in order to standardize and 
reduce the number of greases used by the airline.
 laboratory testing […] somewhat less resistant to water wash-out 
 McDonnell Douglas offered a "no technical objection" 
 A quid pro quo:  Alaska Airlines to return data obtained from in-
service aircraft on wear and tear
 (no data returned)
22
NSOAF 2010. Insidious erosion of safety over time
#Large margins of safety
 the normal flight load in the screw and nut unit is in the 
neighborhood of 4,000 or 5,000 pounds
 When the acme nut is new, the strength of the threads is over 15 
times in excess of design loads. 
 worn to an end play reading of 0.040" (removal threshold) remains 
10 times stronger 
 Taking the end play reading to 0.080", or twice the removal 
threshold, still leaves us with an installation 5 times stronger than 
the maximum design loads.
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NSOAF 2010. Insidious erosion of safety over time
#Lubrication maintenance access
24
Photograph showing maintenance on the horizontal stabilizer of a Northwest Airlines MD-83 aircraft. An 
American Airlines aircraft is in the background
Recommendation: Increase the size of the access panel to accomplish the lubrication 
procedures. 
NSOAF 2010. Insidious erosion of safety over time
#Alaska Airlines, maintenance and 
operations
 Lack of Management Personnel:
– Director of Maintenance position has been vacant for nearly two 
years.
– Director of Operations position is currently vacant.
– The Director of Safety is also the Director of Quality Control and 
Training.
 Maintenance Program:
– General Maintenance Manual (GMM) does not reflect the 
procedures that the company is actually using ….
– Items are being deferred without using the approved [minimum 
equipment list], resulting in items not being repaired for long 
periods of time.
25
in 2000  (post-accident !)
NSOAF 2010. Insidious erosion of safety over time
#FAA oversight break-down
 …widespread significant deficiencies that the FAA should have 
identified earlier. 
 … FAA's surveillance was ineffective before the accident ..[..]..  
inadequate for at least a year before the accident. 
 the replacement of the Program Tracking and Reporting System 
(PTRS) of oversight at Alaska Airlines with the Air Transportation 
Oversight System (ATOS) in October 1998 resulted in "a terrible 
transition" that drastically reduced the amount of time inspectors 
had for actual surveillance activities. 
 "nobody was out there looking at the carrier."
26
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#Recap –
Insidious erosion of safety over time
 lubrication interval extended
 wear check interval extended
 replacement threshold limits open for interpretation
 tool for wear measurement made in-house
 grease type changes (no monitoring, no records kept)
 items not being repaired for long periods of time
 (intensification of aircraft usage)
(intensification of maintenance work)
 Organizational issues
- Director of Maintenance position vacant for nearly two years 
- Director of Operations position vacant.
- The Director of Safety is also the Director of Quality Control 
 Breakdown of regulatory oversight
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NSOAF 2010. Insidious erosion of safety over time
#Characteristics of drift
 Each deviation made local sense, and was only an increment away 
from the previously established norm.
 No rules were violated, no laws broken.
 The oversight regulatory agency concurred with the changes.  
 These were normal people doing normal work
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#Sources
 NSTB (2002) Aircraft Accident Report. Loss of Control and Impact 
with Pacific Ocean. Alaska Airlines Flight 261. McDonnell Douglas 
MD-83, N963AS. About 2.7 Miles North of Anacapa Island, 
California. January 31, 2000. National Transportation Safety Board 
NTSB/AAR-02/01 PB2002-910402 Notation 7263E Adopted 
December 30, 2002
 Dekker S (2005) Ten questions about human error. Taylor and 
Francis
 Schnedler et a. (2007) Alaska Airlines Flight 261: Understanding 
the Systemic Contributors to Organizational Accidents. Systems 
Research Forum, 2007, Vol. 2
 http://lessons.air.mmac.faa.gov/l2/
 some pictures from Wikipedia
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